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erent approaches and techniques to measure bank performance but
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that includes an eciency term. Following this comprehensive measure, we nd that banks
have improved their performance during the period 1986 to 2000 in terms of both eciency
and productivity. Surprisingly, foreign banks have been the worst performers throughout the
period as compared with state owned and private domestic banks.
Keywords: banking, eciency, productivity, cost, frontier.
JEL classication: D21, G21, G28, L33.
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments that have led tosubstantial improvements in the paper. I am deeply indebted to Subrata Sarkar for his help and suggestions.I also thank, for useful comments, Padmini Dasgupta and seminar participants at Indian Statistical Institute,Kolkata where an earlier version of this paper was presented.The remaining errors, if any, are my responsibility.1Address for Correspondence: Rudra Sensarma, Indian Institute of Management, Prabandh Nagar, OSitapur Road, Lucknow-226013, Uttar Pradesh, India. Telephone: +91-522-2736646, Fax: +91-522-2734025,E-mail: rsensarma@gmail.com
1
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen an explosion in research on bank performance across the globe.2
While researchers have used a variety of approaches to measure bank performance, most of
the studies have been restricted to developed economies. Among the few papers that exist for
developing economies, the two common approaches to measuring performance are to estimate
either eciency or productivity of banks based on which inferences about the banking industry
are made. The same is true for papers on Indian banking. In other words, these papers have
either estimated eciency (using a frontier technique) or separately estimated productivity
(ignoring the eciency factor). In this paper, we estimate eciency of Indian banks and then,
following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), estimate a measure of productivity that includes the
eciency term. The results from such an analysis are quite interesting. We nd that both
eciency as well as productivity of foreign banks have been consistently lower than those of
domestic banks. Among the domestic banks, the public banks beneted the most from the
deregulation process and had higher eciency than private banks. In terms of productivity,
private banks appear to have performed better, driven mostly by technical progress.
Existing research on the comparative performance of foreign banks and domestic banks
show conicting conclusions. It has been found that foreign banks are more protable than
domestic banks in developed countries while it is the other way round in developing countries
(Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000). To cite some country-specic studies, for
the U.S. it has been observed that foreign banks are less ecient than domestic banks (Hasan
and Hunter, 1996). But other studies have found that foreign banks are nearly as ecient as
domestic banks in developed countries other than the U.S. (Vennet, 1996; Hasan and Lozano-
Vivas, 1998). For the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, it has been found
that foreign banks were less ecient than domestically owned private banks and state-owned
banks (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2002). In the case of Latin America, some studies have
found that foreign banks were more productive than domestic banks (Barajas, Steiner and
Salazar, 2000) while some others reported little dierence between the performance of the
foreign and domestic banks (Crystal, Dages and Goldberg, 2002).
In this paper we try to compare the performance of foreign banks operating in India with
the domestic banks. India provides a unique case study whereby banking industry is charac-
2See Alam (2001) and Berger and Mester (2003) for discussions of recent literature.
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terized by a mixed ownership structure and the deregulation of the industry in the nineties
had paved the way for a level playing eld between the various ownership groups. Existing
studies on bank performance in India appear to be insucient in comprehensively compar-
ing the performance of foreign banks with domestic banks. Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003a)
estimated Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth and its components using a generalized
shadow cost function approach for public and private banks from 1986 to 1997. This paper did
not allow for ineciency eects in the analysis. On the other hand, Kumbhakar and Sarkar
(2003b) and Shanmugam and Das (2004) estimated bank eciency using various stochastic
frontiers but did not study productivity. It may be mentioned that the present paper uses a
large period of data (viz. 1985 to 2000) to assess the relative performance of dierent bank
groups in India. The data period allows us to also study the impact of deregulation on bank
performance. Essentially, the empirical estimation of the paper proceeds in two steps. The
rst step deals with estimation of eciency using stochastic frontier analysis. In the next
step, measures of productivity are computed based on the stochastic frontier estimates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
the banking industry in India. Section 3 discusses the econometric methodology we employ.
Section 4 introduces the data used in the paper and formalizes the econometric specication.
Section 5 and Section 6 are devoted to discussions of the results from the analysis of eciency
and productivity, respectively. Finally, Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
2 Institutional Structure and Recent Changes in Indian Bank-
ing
The importance of banking in the Indian economy can be gauged from the fact that aggregate
deposits stood at 49 % of GDP in 2002 and bank credit to the government and commercial
sector stood at 26 % and 33 % of GDP respectively in 2002 (Reserve Bank of India, 2005). The
banking industry in India is characterized by the coexistence of state-owned or public sector
banks, domestic private incumbents (or private banks), foreign banks and domestic private
entrants (or new private banks). Historically, the industry was dominated by the public sector
banks while the activities of the private sector (both domestic and foreign) were severely
controlled by India's Central Bank, the Reserve Bank of India. However falling protability
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and ineciency in the banking system precipitated the rst set of banking sector reforms in
1992 that facilitated entry deregulation, branch de-licensing, deregulation of interest rates,
and operational freedom for public sector banks. Consequent to these reforms, 9 new private
banks started operations in the mid-nineties.
A level playing eld was created by subjecting all bank groups to the same prudential
norms, such as Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and Statutory Liquidity Ration (SLR), while
also introducing capital adequacy norms and income recognition and provisioning norms. In
the backdrop of the South-East Asian Crisis and the Basel Committee recommendations,
the `second generation reforms' of the late nineties imposed stricter capital adequacy and
Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) norms, market risk on government securities, and introduced
Assets-Liabilities management and Risk management guidelines.Thus the banking reforms,
initiated since 1992 were intended to impart enhanced eciency, productivity and protability
into the system. Even in this level playing eld, the industry is still dominated by a few large
banks and entry is still closely monitored by the regulator. This has encouraged strategic
competition among banks and the market structure is closer to that of oligopoly. Hence, it
is in this backdrop that we attempt to assess the relative performance of the public sector
banks with the domestic private and the foreign banks.
3 Econometric Methodology
The disadvantage of using regression models in studying bank performance (as in Kumbhakar
and Sarkar, 2003a) is that such models assume that all banks are equally ecient which is quite
a strong restriction. It is widely accepted that large variations in banking data necessitates the
application of frontier analysis. In this paper we employ the parametric method of stochastic
frontier analysis (SFA) because of its ability to capture error in the data that may arise out
of luck, data problems, or other measurement errors.3
SFA was developed independently by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and
van den Broeck (1977). Since then, the original specication has been modied and extended
in a number of ways. In this paper we will be using the Battese and Coelli (1995) methodology
of stochastic frontier analysis which is popular in the literature due to several advantages
3The other popular frontier technique is the Data Envelopment Analysis which is a non-parametric methodthat does not allow for any random error.
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that it oers compared to traditional methodologies. It allows simultaneous estimation of
the frontier function and the ineciency function in a single maximum likelihood procedure
which avoids the theoretical problems of the traditional two-step approaches (Battese and
Coelli, 1995). Moreover, it is easily amenable to analysis of panel data and allows for time-
varying ineciency. As regards the specication of the frontier, banking being a multi-product
industry, we take recourse to the cost function for estimating eciency. The Battese and Coelli
(1995) model for a cost frontier is briey outlined as follows. Assuming that a producer's
objective is to minimize cost, the cost frontier based on panel data can be represented as:
Cit = f(Yit;Wit) + Uit + Vit (1)
where i indexes banks and t indexes time. As for the variables, C is cost, Y is the output vector
and W is a vector of factor prices (all variables measured in logs). The random error, Vit 
iid N(0; ﬀV 2), and the ineciency factor, Uit  non-negative truncation of independently
distributed N(it; ﬀU 2), where, it = Zit.4 The ineciency model is thus specied as:
Uit = Zit + it (2)
where Zit is an 1xp vector of variables which may inuence the ineciency of a rm and
 is a px1 vector of parameters to be estimated. The ith bank's cost eciency relative to
the cost frontier is dened as, CEit = exp( Uit). The parameterization from Battese and
Corra (1977) is used, replacing ﬀV 2 and ﬀU 2 with ﬀS2 = ﬀV 2 + ﬀU 2 and  = ﬀU 2=ﬀS2. The
parameters are estimated by the Maximum Likelihood (ML) approach. The log-likelihood
function of this model is given in Battese and Coelli (1993).
4 Data and Econometric Specication
The rst step in modeling bank behavior is to decide whether deposits form part of output or
input of a bank. We follow the value added approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Grifell-
4Because we are pooling banks with dierent sizes, the data may be characterized by heteroskedasticity.This may lead to biased estimates in a stochastic frontier model where one part of the error term is distributedasymmetrically (Caudill, Ford and Gropper, 1995; Hadri, 1999). Christopoulos and Tsionas (2001) havediscussed this issue specically in the context of banking. According to Wang (2003), the heteroskedasticityof U can be modeled through a non-constant  or a non-constant ﬀU 2 or both. The approach of Battese andCoelli (1995) is to make  observation specic and we follow this since the other approaches lead to loss of toomany degrees of freedom.
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Tatje and Lovell, 1996; Berg et al., 1993) that treats deposits and loans as output.5 Thus, our
output vector consists of value of xed deposits (FD), saving deposits (SD), current deposits
(CD), investments (INV) and loans and advances (ADV). Apart from these, we also include
the number of branches (B) as an output variable. Branches can proxy for the quality of
services (Berg et al., 1993) and therefore ignoring branches amounts to omitting a costly
service that provides transactions convenience to customers (Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1996).
Number of branches also proxies for the size of bank transactions. This is important since the
deposit and loan outputs of a bank should be ideally measured in terms of number of deposit
and loan accounts produced by a bank rather than their value (Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1996).
Given the unavailability of the number of accounts data in India, while we employ the value
of deposits and loans of each bank as output, it might be appropriate to use the number of
branches as an imperfect control for the size of transactions. Labor (L) and Capital (K) are
the two variable inputs. The dependent variable is total operating cost (C), which is the sum
of labor and capital costs (it does not include interest expended).
Price of labor (wL) is obtained by dividing total establishment expenses by total number
of employees. Price of capital (wK) is obtained by dividing the total capital expenditure by
total xed assets. All nominal variables are converted to real by measuring them at 1993-94
prices. The data is taken from various issues of Financial Analysis of Banks and Performance
Highlights of Banks published by the Indian Banks' Association. We use data on 27 public
sector banks (public banks, henceforth), 25 domestic private sector banks (private banks,
henceforth), 22 foreign banks, and 9 new domestic private sector banks (new private banks,
henceforth) that started operating after deregulation. New private banks are the only entrants
in this study and their data is available from 1996.6 In selecting the old private banks and
foreign banks, we used data availability as the criterion of inclusion in our sample. 15 years
of data is taken from the year 1986 to 2000.
Note that we dier from the existing cost-based studies in Indian banking (e.g. Kumbhakar
and Sarkar, 2003a; Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003b; Shanmugam and Das, 2004) in several
ways. First, we are including both foreign and new private (entrants) banks as separate
5Indeed most studies on Indian banks have used this approach (see Das, 1997; Kumbhakar and Sarkar,2003a; Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003b). The value added approach also appears to be intuitively more appealingfor Indian banking where deposit mobilization is one of main the objectives of banks. Moreover, consideringdeposits as output takes into account the quality of services provided by a bank.6In our set of 83 banks, none of the foreign banks that entered the industry after entry deregulation couldbe included because of considerations of data availability.
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groups in the analysis. This allows us to compare the performance of foreign banks and
domestic entrants with the domestic incumbents. Second, we look at the role of size in
determining eciency. Third, we consider each category of deposit as a separate element in
the output vector since they are inherently dierent in characteristics and banks' strategy
regarding each category might be dierent. Fourth, our estimates of TFP growth include a
component for eciency growth obtained from the SFA, which has not been considered by
any of the existing studies.
We adopt the translog (transcendental logarithm) form which is a second order approxima-
tion of any unknown function as our specication of the frontier in expression (1). The translog
function in our case takes the following form: lnCit = a0+Pm am ln ymit+Pj bj lnwjit+btt+
0:5PmPl aml ln ymit ln ylit + 0:5PjPk bjk lnwjit lnwkit + 0:5bttt2+P
m
P
j amj ln ymit lnwjit +Pm amt ln ymitt+Pj bjt lnwjitt+ uit + vit
Next we impose certain theoretically desirable properties. We apply the usual symme-
try restrictions, that follow from Young's theorem, aml = alm and bjk = bkj . To ensure
linear homogeneity in w, the following restrictions are imposed, Pj bj = 1, Pj bjk = 0 8k,P
j amj = 0 8m, Pj bjt = 0. Cost and input prices are normalized by the price of capital
before taking logarithms to impose linear input price homogeneity.
Next, to model the ineciency term, we hypothesize that the determinants of bank inef-
ciency are deregulation, size and nature of ownership. We also include labour and capital
(in logarithm terms) as explanatory variables for ineciency to allow for non-neutral spec-
ication (Huang and Liu, 1994). Hence we specify the ineciency equation, once again in
translog form, as follows: Uit = 0 +Pk iZkit + 0:5PkPr krZkitZrit + it
The vector Zit includes the following variables, Z 0it = (T, DEREG, SIZE, PUB, PVT,
NEWPVT, L, K), where the square of the dummy variables are excluded to avoid singularity
of the regressor matrix. T is year which represents change in ineciency over time. DEREG is
a deregulation dummy that takes the value one for years 1993 and above, and zero otherwise.7
Deregulation is expected to have reduced ineciency in the banking sector. SIZE is taken to
be log of total assets (i.e. sum of INV and ADV). The coecient of SIZE would indicate the
7The year 1993 was selected as the deregulation year because it yielded the maximum value of likelihoodfunction compared to the other years and also the plot of ineciencies without any deregulation dummyshowed the sharpest kink at 1993. This is expected because implementation of the recommendations of therst Narasimham Committee, that triggered o banking reforms in India, started in January 1992 (Kumbhakarand Sarkar, 2003b).
7
eect of bank size on ineciency.
PUB, PVT and NEWPVT are ownership dummies that take value one if the bank belongs
to the public sector, private sector and new private sector respectively. The only other sector
is foreign, which becomes the base for interpreting the ownership dummies. As discussed
earlier, ineciency is expected to vary across ownership groups because of the dierence in
governance structures. Interactive terms among the above variables are expected to indicate
how each explanatory factor may be aecting ineciency through interaction with another.
5 Empirical Findings on Eciency
We estimate the cost frontier twice, once without including any bank group dummies in the
frontier and next with group dummies. The former (which we will refer to as Model 1)
provides a common frontier for the banking industry relative to which the ineciencies are
estimated whereas the latter (which we will refer to as Model 2) makes the frontier specic to
environmental conditions in each bank group. The results of the estimation for the common
frontier and the group-specic frontier are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. Since
the main focus of the analysis is on ineciency and its determinants, we do not discuss the
estimated coecients of the cost frontier in details. However we note that while the coecients
of xed deposits and branches are positive as expected, it is not so for the output variables.
But these signs themselves are not of much concern, since the theoretical requirement is that
the cost elasticity of output should be positive, which we do obtain (with a few exceptions)
when we consider all the interaction terms and compute the corresponding elasticities.
(Tables 1 and 2 here)
Before we discuss the estimated parameters of the ineciency function and present the
ineciency estimates we ought to verify statistically whether there is any need to use the
stochastic frontier model framework and whether bank-specic ineciency eects are at all
present in the cost function of Indian banking. This can be done by rst performing a
composite test of  = 0 =... = 13=0. The test uses a generalized likelihood ratio (LR
henceforth) which follows a mixed chi-squared distribution (Coelli and Battese, 1996). A
generalized LR test is required since  can not take negative values and hence the test must
be performed as a one-sided test. Moreover, the LR test statistic does not have a chi-square
distribution because the restriction denes a point on the boundary of the parameter space.
8
In this case the likelihood ratio statistic follows a mixed chi-square distribution with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of parameters.
The generalized likelihood ratio test rejected the above hypothesis (LR test statistic of
the one-sided error is 692.29 for Model 1 and is 711.17 for Model 2, both of which are
greater than the appropriate mixed-Chi square statistic available in Table 1 of Kodde and
Palm, 1986). Hence the simple average response function estimation is not adequate and a
stochastic frontier estimation is necessary. We also test whether the ineciency eects have
a traditional half-normal distribution with zero mean or not. This can be done by testing for
0 =... = 13=0. A generalized LR test rejected the above hypothesis (LR test statistic is
690.67 for Model 1 and 692.90 for Model 2, both of which are greater than the appropriate
mixed-Chi square statistic available in Table 1 of Kodde and Palm, 1986). Hence our tests
suggest that indeed bank specic ineciency eects are present and that such ineciencies
are better modeled within a stochastic frontier framework.
Moving to the behavior of ineciency, from Tables 1 and 2 we observe the role of deter-
minants of ineciency from the last three columns of the tables. The impact of each variable
of the Z vector on ineciency can be understood by collecting and computing all terms in
@E(Uit)@Zkit from the ineciency equation. The coecients of most of the terms containing T in
the ineciency model are negative. In fact, collecting all relevant terms it has been observed
that the impact of T on ineciency is negative in both models 1 and 2, which suggests that
during the sample period, cost eciency increased over time on an average for the industry.
However, deregulation led to an increase in cost ineciency.8 This is indicated by a positive
and signicant coecient of DEREG in a model with only T and DEREG*T as regressors
in the ineciency equation. This suggests that deregulation led to a fall in cost eciency,
although there was a temporal increase in cost eciency during the entire period.
The role of ownership in determining cost ineciency is provided by the group dummies.
We observe that most of the terms containing the public, private and new private dummies
are signicant in both models 1 and 2, indicating that ownership is indeed a signicant
determinant of ineciency. The relative performance of the bank groups would be analyzed
later by presenting gures of average cost eciency across groups. The next question we turn
to is the role of size in cost ineciency. In other words, are big banks more ecient or less
8This result is consistent with Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003b).
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ecient than small banks? Moreover, since public banks are on an average bigger than the
other bank groups, it is natural to ask whether it is the eect of size that tends to show up
through the public bank dummy. Collecting all terms containing SIZE and computing its
impact on ineciency revealed a positive relationship in both models, thereby implying that
size adversely aects cost eciency.
Next we discuss the behavior of cost eciency in both models. From the bank-wise
estimates of eciency, we computed the group-wise eciency estimates for each year by taking
a simple mean over the constituent banks of each group.9 These mean eciencies are reported
in Table 3 and are presented graphically in Figure 1. We observe for Model 1 that in most
of the years, private banks appear to have performed better in terms of cost eciency than
the public, new private and foreign banks in that order. Although the immediate impact of
deregulation was to reduce cost eciency, public banks were gradually able to take advantage
of the deregulation process better than the private banks and outperformed them in the later
years. Compared to the other groups, new private banks appear to have achieved a rapid
rise in cost eciency. This may have happened due to their late entry into the industry
because of which they had the advantage of not carrying any baggage from the past, as
was the case with the other groups. Therefore the new private banks may have successfully
managed their business at lower operating costs than the other groups. The striking part of
the results is that foreign banks appeared to have the lowest cost eciency. This is contrary
to popular perception in India and we try to explain this result later. However in Model 2
we observe that public banks have higher cost eciency than private banks throughout the
sample period.Foreign and new private banks come next in the order.
(Table 3 and Figure 1 here)
The above results can be interpreted as follows. First, the decline of cost ineciency over
the entire sample period is consistent with Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003b) who found that
although cost ineciency declined over time, the rate of decline slowed down subsequent to
deregulation. It is expected that over time, with increased competitive pressure and entry of
new banks, intermediation costs will come down and thereby cost eciency of the banking
sector will rise. Banks, in general, have been able to contain operating costs, and have
therefore moved towards the best banks (that comprise the frontier) over the entire time
9Weighted means did not change the results qualitatively.
10
period. However the immediate impact of deregulation was to increase cost ineciency.
Deregulation brought about substantial changes in technology and business practices, that is
expected to shift the cost frontier inwards. However individual banks may have been slow to
respond and reorient their strategies to the changing circumstances. But over time they are
expected to catch up with the `best' banks comprising the frontier. Thus, although eciency
decreased around the time of deregulation, over time and overall, there has been a rise.
Second, private banks are more cost ecient than public banks in the pre-deregulation
period when compared in a common frontier. In this respect, the pre-deregulation situation
is consistent with the property rights hypothesis and public choice theory.10 However public
banks beneted more from deregulation and outperformed the private banks subsequent to
deregulation in terms of their cost eciency. On the other hand when compared to group-
specic frontiers, private banks appeared to be less cost ecient than public banks even in
the pre-deregulation period. In other words while there were private banks lying close to
the industry frontier prior to deregulation, yet most of the public banks were closer to the
`best' banks in their own group. However subsequent to deregulation, not only did public
banks continue to be close to their own frontier, there were more public banks comprising
the industry frontier than private banks. Thus overall, private banks appear to have been
less cost ecient and more so in the post-deregulation period. This could be because private
banks took the lead in investing in new revenue generating practices which led to a lot
of additional costs. These were in the form of computerization of branches, setting up of
Advanced Ledger Posting Machine (ALPM) branches, computer training of employees, up-
gradation of technology etc. Thus, while the private banks might have made these costly
investments with an eye on earning higher revenues, they appear to have lost out in terms of
cost eciency. Provision of better quality of output may lead to enhanced revenues for banks
even while they take a hit in terms of cost eciency. Berger and Mester (2003) refer to this
as the `increasing quality hypothesis'.
Foreign banks were the worst performers in terms of cost eciency in both models. The
reasons for this could be that foreign banks incur huge expenditure in paying high salaries
to employees. A survey conducted on 62 banks by the Reserve Bank of India found that as
on March 31, 2002, sta expenses per employee in million Indian Rupees was the highest for
10Both these theories opine that private entities are more ecient that public entities due to weakly denedproperty rights and X-ineciencies present in the latter.
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foreign banks at 9.16, followed by new private banks at 3.04, public banks at 2.53 and private
banks at 2.13 (Reserve Bank of India, 2002).11 In fact an overwhelming proportion of employ-
ees in foreign banks are highly paid ocers as compared with domestic banks which employ
proportionately more clerks and subordinates. Foreign banks also incur huge expenditure on
costly real estate being mostly based in urban and metropolitan areas. Moreover, the public
and private banks have a historical advantage of having established business structures and
infrastructure in India which most of the new foreign banks do not.
Further, the use of technology is much more in the case of foreign banks which may lead
to huge costs. This is evidenced by the above mentioned survey which showed that foreign
banks were ahead of the public and private banks in terms of Information Technology use.
Domestic banks have a large part of their portfolio as committed lending in the priority sector
while foreign banks incur a lot of expenditure in trying to push retain loans in order to expand
their asset portfolio. Another reason why foreign banks performed badly could be that foreign
banks in India are really small fractions of their parent entities who operate globally. The
foreign banks in India are branch oces of the parent bank, and not subsidiaries. Thus the
parent entities may not put much emphasis on the performance of their few Indian branches.
Moreover, the foreign banks operating in India are not listed in the Indian stock markets.
Hence the market forces that usually cause private entitites to be more ecient than public
entities may not be operating on foreign banks.12 However, while foreign banks did badly on
the cost front, they might actually have incurred new costs in order to hunt for newer sources
of revenue (`increasing quality hypothesis'). In fact, both foreign and private banks tried to
garner newer sources of revenue, for which they undertook additional expenditure thereby
taking them away from the cost frontier.
Thus, subsequent to deregulation, cost eciency of public banks has been higher relative
to other bank groups. With the introduction of sucient deregulation, public banks could
improve their performance in terms of cost eciency and outperform their private counter-
parts. On the other hand, as mentioned already, the improvement in cost eciency of public
banks vis-a-vis private banks could also have happened because the private banks incurred
11The exchange rate was 48.8 Rupees to a Dollar at end-year 2002.12While it may be true that the scrips of only a few private banks are actively traded in the stock market, theprocess of listing itself requires the disclosure of certain parameters as mandated by Securities and ExchangeBoard of India (SEBI), which is the capital market regulator. These disclosure norms may lead to marketpressure on the listed banks to improve their performance.
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a lot of costs in attempting to provide superior quality of services with the expectation of
higher revenues. Thus, the role of competition appears to be strong in terms of aecting
performance of banks in terms of cost eciency.
Lastly, bigger banks were seen to be less cost ecient. This indicates that it might be
more dicult to manage costs in bigger banks, which gets reected in lower cost eciency.
This result has been reported earlier in the literature. For example, Christopoulos, Lolos and
Tsionas (2002) found that in Greece, larger banks are less cost ecient than their smaller
counterparts. They attribute it to the fact that larger banks tend to have inecient manage-
ment, low sta motivation and strict labor relations. Moreover, bigger banks have a greater
burden of the cost of maintaining an extended branch network which caters to deposit mobi-
lization but does not contribute to selling priced products. This may be true for Indian banks
as well.
So far we have estimated cost eciency of Indian banks. This is only one measure of
bank performance and we need to compute productivity to complete the picture. In fact a
low (high) value of one of these two measures does not necessarily imply a low (high) value
of the other. Productivity consists of scale eects and technical change eects, in addition to
eciency growth. Hence, a bank with low cost eciency could be reaping scale economies so
as to have a high productivity growth. Alternatively, it could also have higher productivity
growth through a shift in the frontier (technical change) due to implementation of better
technology. Thus a study of performance would remain incomplete without an analysis of
productivity growth. We turn to these issues in the following section.
6 Productivity Analysis
TFP of any rm can be intuitively understood as a measure of output produced relative to
input usage. Eciency change, as estimated in the previous section, can be viewed as one of
the components of a broader measure of TFP growth. According to Kumbhakar and Lovell
(2000), until very recently, econometric models of productivity growth had ignored the role
of eciency growth. Productivity growth was supposed to consist of shifts in production
technology i.e. technical change, and also the biases of technical change and the structure of
the technology i.e. scale economies. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) give a measure of TFP
based on the cost frontier consisting of the above two components as well as eciency growth,
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which we discuss below.
The Divisia index of TFP growth for multiple outputs can be written as:13
_TFP = _Y   _X (3)
=X
m
Rm _ym  Xm Sm _xm
where Rm = pmym=Pm pmym is the revenue share of output ym, pm is the price of output
ym and Sm is the cost share of input xm.
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) considered the following deterministic cost frontier:
lnE = lnC(Y;W; t) + U (4)
where, E = WX is total expenditure, X = (x1; :::; xN )  0 is the input vector, W > 0
is the input price vector, Y = (y1; :::; yM )  0 is the output vector, t is a time trend that
serves as a proxy for technical change, C(Y;W; t) is the deterministic kernel of a stochastic
cost frontier, U is the technical ineciency term. Totally dierentiating equation (4), solving
for _Y , substituting it in (3) and some algebraic manipulation yields an estimable expression
for TFP growth:
_TFP =   _C(Y;W; t) + [1  (Y;W; t)] _Y   @U@t (5)
where (Y;W; t) = Pm m(Y;W; t), m(Y;W; t) is cost elasticity of the mth output, and
_Y = Pm [ m(Y;W;t)(Y;W;t) ] is a measure of aggregate output growth. Expression (5) provides a
decomposition of TFP growth into a technical change component (say, _TFP1), a scale eect
component (say, _TFP2) and an eciency growth component (say, _TFP3). Thus we have TFP
growth as a sum of three components as follows:
_TFP = _TFP1 + _TFP2 + _TFP3 (6)
In this study, we construct indices of each component of TFP, i.e. TFPi(t) = TFPi(t  
1)[1+ _TFPi(t)] and it is set at 100 for the rst year. The mean _TFPi are calculated for each
bank group for each year. Based on these means, TFPi are computed for each bank group
13Note that the Tornqvist index is a discrete approximation of the continuous Divisia index.
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for each year. TFP is computed in a similar fashion.14 Once again we report our estimates
based on both a common frontier (Model 1) and group-specic frontiers (Model 2). It also
needs to be noted here that the TFP gures for new private banks are not strictly comparable
with those of the other groups since the initial year for this group is 1996 at which their TFP
is set to be 100, whereas the initial year for all other groups is 1986. The mean values for all
bank groups are reported in Tables 4 and 5 for Model 1 and in Tables 6 and 7 for Model 2.
(Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 here)
The estimates of TFP1 give the technical change component. Estimates from both models
1 and 2 reveal that there has been a technical improvement across the industry as far as costs
are concerned. The exception is foreign banks for whom the index shows a decline. Thus,
for the domestic banks there was a downward shift in the cost frontier. It is only expected
that over the years and aided by deregulation, there would be signicant improvements in
technology, procedures and practices for domestic banks, which could shift the cost frontier
inwards (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003b). Moreover, in an economy moving from a regulated
to a deregulated regime, competition is expected to drive down intermediation costs which
would also get manifested as inwards shift of the cost frontier leading to improvement in
the technical change component of TFP. A similar result was obtained by Chaai (1997) for
Tunisian banking whereby he found that deregulation had indeed led to technical progress.
There is also a clear hierarchy in the way bank groups have behaved. Private banks have
performed the best, followed by public and foreign banks. Although the TFP levels of new
private banks are not strictly comparable with the other groups, we can observe that there
was technological improvement even for this group of banks. By reconstructing all the indices
with the value for 1996 as 100, we could incorporate comparable values of all groups with new
private banks for the period 1996-2000. This showed that new private banks were second only
to private banks in performance in this period. It may be mentioned that Kumbhakar and
Sarkar (2003a) found no signicant technological improvement in public or private banks.
Their study however did not have a cost frontier, whereas our results show that the cost
frontier has indeed shifted inwards which gets manifested as technical change.
Tables 4 to 7 also report the movement of mean TFP2 which gives the scale eect compo-
14Since the initial value of the productivity indices are set at 100 for all groups, here we miss out thedierence in their initial levels which we were able to analyze from the eciency estimates. However, herethe indices can suggest, based on the growth rates of each component of productivity, how the bank groupscorrected or worsened their performance.
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nent. As discussed earlier, this component of TFP is based on the aggregate output growth
and the elasticities. This component basically reects the eect of returns to scale and output
expansion on TFP growth. Our estimates for Model 1 show that all banks exhibit a stagnant
or marginal decline in TFP2 but in Model 2 the estimates for private, foreign and new private
banks exhibit a rise. This result is similar to the recovery for private banks found by Kumb-
hakar and Sarkar (2003a) who state that \this is perhaps expected because the opportunity to
realize potential scale economies was signicantly enhanced in the post-deregulation period
with the removal of various regulations that prohibited the expansion of private banks in
the earlier years." Since the gures for new private banks are not comparable with the other
groups, we recomputed indices for all bank groups with base as 1996 and found that new
private banks perform the worst in terms of TFP2 during the period 1996-2000.
Tables 4 to 7 also report the movement of mean TFP3 which gives the eciency growth
component. While we have studied the behavior of cost eciency levels of bank groups in
Table 3, TFP3 represents an index based on the growth of the same eciencies. Unlike in
the levels, we nd that foreign banks have mostly outperformed public and private banks in
terms of eciency growth in both models 1 and 2. However, as in the levels, public banks
appear to have performed better than the private banks especially in the post-deregulation
period. While new private banks are not strictly comparable with the other groups, their
performance in terms of TFP3 shows a high growth in eciency as was evident from the
eciency levels in Figure 1. When the indices were recalculated for 1996-2000 with base at
1996, new private banks turned out to be the best performers in this period.
The composite TFP index is also reported in Tables 4 to 7 while the same is plotted
in Figure 2. This gives the overall performance of banks in terms of TFP. Figure 2 clearly
reveals the following salient features regarding TFP of Indian banks. First, both models 1
and 2 demonstrate that there has been a sustained rise in TFP of all bank groups during
the sample period. As discussed earlier, this is an expected feature of a deregulating banking
industry where improved technology as well as increased competitive pressure would lead
to an inwards shift of the cost frontier, thus leading to improvement in TFP. Second, there
is not much dierence between public and private banks in Model 1. The rise in TFP of
both the groups and in tandem with each other suggest that the ownership eect is not very
strong. This points towards the fact that competitive pressure prevailed on public banks
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to maintain their productivity levels at par with that of private banks indicating that the
role of competition is important in determining performance. However in Model 2, private
banks exhibit a higher TFP than public banks possibly because of their better performance
in technological improvement within their own environmental conditions.
(Figure 2 here)
Third, foreign banks have been the worst performers especially in the post-deregulation
period which can be explained in terms of the fact that foreign banks incur a lot of expenses
in acquiring top-end customers and new technology and also the pressure on foreign banks
to contain costs is less as compared to other bank groups. Thus their high cost practices
adversely aected their productivity. Deposits, which are considered as output in our study,
form a very small fraction of foreign bank's total liabilities (59.5 % in 2000) as compared with
domestic banks (over 80 % in all cases). This may show up as low productivity. In fact, foreign
banks do not understand local markets as well as the domestic banks do, which impairs their
productivity. Small and medium entrepreneurs and often even Indian corporate entities are
loathe to approaching foreign banks since they are given more exibilities by domestic banks
and also feel more comfortable in banking with the domestic banks.
Lastly, new private banks exhibited a rapid rise in TFP in both models. In fact, with
indices for all banks recomputed with base as 1996, new private banks turned out to be the
best performers during this period. Their TFP was the highest and increased rapidly in
comparison with the other groups. The reason may be that, being late entrants, the new
private banks had the advantage of not carrying any baggage from the past. Moreover these
banks had to incur initial setup costs without any immediate output at the time of starting
their operations. However the initial investments started yielding rapid output growth in the
subsequent years. This may get manifested in the high TFP of this bank group.
7 Conclusion
This paper studied eciency and productivity of scheduled commercial banks in India during
the period 1986 to 2000 using a stochastic cost frontier approach. SFA gave us estimates of
cost ineciency and its determinants. Then, using the parameter and eciency estimates
from the frontiers, various measures of productivity and their components were computed.
Implications were drawn in terms of the role of ownership, competition and deregulation.
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The ndings of the paper may be summarized as follows. The results indicate that al-
though there are cost ineciencies in the Indian banking sector, they have been declining over
time even while deregulation led to a slowdown in the rate of decline. In line with the cost
eciency results, we nd that TFP has also gone up for all bank groups during the period
under study. Thus deregulation in Indian banking industry achieved the aim of reduction in
intermediation costs and improving productivity.
Interestingly, public banks have done as well as private banks (and often better) in the
post-deregulation period both in terms of cost eciency as well as TFP. This is similar to the
ndings of Bhaumik and Dimova (2004) who, on the basis of prot measures, concluded that
public banks have been able to bridge the dierence with private banks and hence the role
of competition is more important than that of ownership. Similarly, using our cost measures
we observe that so far as the domestic banks are concerned, the role of ownership was not as
important during the phase of deregulation. Deregulation, through introduction of greater
competition into the banking industry, has helped public banks to enhance their performance
as indicated by their cost eciency and TFP.
Nevertheless, foreign banks have been poor performers in terms of cost eciency and
productivity. This could be due to the costly practices followed by foreign banks in India.
Moreover, deposits being a small proportion of their total liabilities may lead to the low TFP.
On the other hand, performance of new private banks in terms of cost eciency and TFP
appears to have been the best in the industry. This is not a surprising result, since new
private banks being recent entrants in the industry did not suer from the burden of old costs
incurred due to various factors like loss making branches, over-stang etc., as was the case
with the incumbents. As a result, while they could compete with the other groups in terms
of banking services, they could also manage to keep operating costs under control.
In sum, one lesson that emerges from the empirical exercises is that intermediation costs
have declined in Indian banking and total factor productivity has increased. In other words,
deregulation has achieved the desired results. This is true even for public banks who appear
to have beneted from the increased competition resulting from entry, and performed as well
as private banks and sometimes better. More signicantly, public banks have performed
considerably better than foreign banks. However this result is not sucient to say that state
ownership is superior to private (domestic or foreign) ownership. It may be that less costly
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practices of the public banks get reected in lower protability. Moreover there may be scope
of improvement in the public banks themselves as compared with where they presently stand.
Whether there can be strategies for public sector banks to perform even better and what role
does this leave for foreign banks to play in India is left for our future research.
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Table 1: Maximum Likeli-hood Estimates of the Stochastic Cost Frontier Without Group
Dummies based on Panel Data for Banks for Years 1986 to 2000
Beta Estimate t-ratio Delta Estimate t-ratioCONST -2.967 -3.450 CONST -3.044 -3.868FD 2.002 3.803 T -0.050 -0.600SD -1.135 -4.806 DER -0.516 -0.636CD -0.413 -1.754 SIZE -1.197 -3.948INV -0.804 -2.130 PUB -15.421 -11.846ADV -0.087 -0.213 PVT 0.220 0.279B 1.688 11.281 NPVT 1.547 1.925W 0.235 1.653 DER*T 0.128 0.953T 0.126 3.423 DER*PUB 0.133 0.178FD2 -0.023 -0.238 DER*PVT 0.586 0.808SD2 -0.120 -2.985 DER*NPVT 3.094 1.925CD2 -0.044 -0.977 T2 0.003 0.372INV2 0.024 0.138 SIZE2 -0.260 -2.627ADV2 0.264 2.355 T*SIZE -0.011 -0.301B2 -0.016 -0.775 T*PUB 0.220 2.764W2 -0.007 -0.491 T*PVT 0.069 0.921T2 -0.004 -3.472 T*NPVT -0.593 -5.421FD*SD 0.240 3.175 SIZE*DER 0.077 0.237FD*CD 0.082 1.122 SIZE*PUB -4.342 -11.892FD*INV 0.027 0.194 SIZE*PVT -0.064 -0.168FD*ADV -0.288 -3.383 SIZE*NPVT 0.144 0.500FD*B -0.123 -2.772 L 3.563 5.579FD*W 0.076 1.571 K 12.451 11.054FD*T -0.022 -1.846 L2 -1.521 -4.817SD*CD 0.012 0.417 K2 1.134 0.697SD*INV -0.167 -2.660 L*T -0.006 -0.085SD*ADV -0.066 -1.314 L*SIZE 1.122 3.329SD*B 0.083 3.231 L*DER 0.053 0.082SD*W -0.077 -3.934 L*PUB 10.442 12.679SD*T 0.014 2.257 L*PVT -1.612 -2.557CD*INV -0.058 -0.901 L*NPVT -0.060 -0.088CD*ADV -0.022 -0.380 L*K -6.797 -6.281CD*B 0.023 1.134 K*T -0.238 -1.782CD*W -0.030 -1.331 K*SIZE 1.479 2.107CD*T 0.010 1.954 K*DER -3.086 -2.165INV*ADV 0.170 2.090 K*PUB 5.732 5.206INV*B 0.058 1.518 K*PVT 5.887 4.475INV*W -0.018 -0.487 K*NPVT -0.020 -0.017INV*T 0.015 1.302 Sigma2 0.057 22.958ADV*B -0.014 -0.462 Gamma 0.832 59.891ADV*W -0.026 -0.683 Log Likelihood 561.475ADV*T -0.005 -0.509 LR Test for  = i = 0;8i 692.286*B*W 0.104 8.387 LR Test for i = 0;8i 690.666*B*T -0.011 -3.148 Number of Banks 83W*T 0.005 1.359 Number of Observations 991Notes: FD = Fixed Deposits, SD = Saving Deposits, CD = Current Deposits,INV = Investments, ADV = Loans and Advances, B = Number of branches,W = Wage-rental ratio, T = Time trend (Year), * denotes signicance (Kodde and Palm, 1986)
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Table 2: Maximum Likeli-hood Estimates of the Stochastic Cost Frontier With Group Dum-
mies based on Panel Data for Banks for Years 1986 to 2000
Beta Estimate t-ratio Delta Estimate t-ratioCONST -3.547 -3.934 CONST -1.847 -2.712FD 1.339 2.816 T 0.030 0.406SD -1.133 -5.153 DER -0.653 -1.091CD -0.090 -0.395 SIZE -0.810 -3.198INV -0.351 -1.032 PUB -11.322 -11.213ADV -0.140 -0.358 PVT -4.022 -8.643B 1.176 7.712 NPVT 1.316 1.710W 0.054 0.392 DER*T 0.057 0.690T 0.192 4.806 DER*PUB -0.098 -0.157FD2 0.014 0.158 DER*PVT -0.500 -0.887SD2 -0.100 -2.941 DER*NPVT 2.632 1.710CD2 0.005 0.128 T2 0.004 0.723INV2 -0.147 -0.987 SIZE2 -0.192 -2.415ADV2 0.179 1.722 T*SIZE 0.005 0.196B2 0.038 1.863 T*PUB 0.300 4.352W2 -0.027 -1.960 T*PVT 0.210 3.415T2 -0.006 -4.779 T*NPVT -0.213 -2.365FD*SD 0.126 2.051 SIZE*DER -0.112 -0.527FD*CD 0.008 0.123 SIZE*PUB -3.476 -12.736FD*INV 0.090 0.750 SIZE*PVT -1.340 -4.665FD*ADV -0.249 -3.245 SIZE*NPVT 0.415 1.835FD*B -0.066 -1.869 L 2.176 4.052FD*W 0.047 1.075 K 11.306 10.598FD*T -0.021 -1.898 L2 -0.656 -2.529SD*CD 0.008 0.316 K2 0.855 0.703SD*INV -0.037 -0.715 L*T -0.084 -1.344SD*ADV -0.026 -0.590 L*SIZE 0.770 2.801SD*B 0.042 1.862 L*DER 0.491 0.935SD*W -0.084 -4.743 L*PUB 6.804 10.613SD*T 0.016 2.812 L*PVT 1.764 4.218CD*INV -0.028 -0.499 L*NPVT -0.645 -1.270CD*ADV -0.004 -0.083 L*K -5.780 -5.947CD*B 0.007 0.416 K*T -0.150 -1.566CD*W -0.006 -0.284 K*SIZE 1.037 2.111CD*T 0.011 2.045 K*DER -2.608 -2.902INV*ADV 0.092 1.234 K*PUB 3.676 3.622INV*B 0.039 1.188 K*PVT 2.249 2.240INV*W 0.000 0.006 K*NPVT -2.277 -2.658INV*T 0.018 1.697 Sigma2 0.032 13.093ADV*B 0.021 0.801 Gamma 0.839 53.782ADV*W -0.033 -0.924 Log Likelihood 650.190ADV*T 0.001 0.154 LR Test for  = i = 0;8i 711.174*B*W 0.105 9.240 LR Test for i = 0;8i 692.902*B*T -0.019 -4.921 Number of Banks 83W*T 0.009 2.630 Number of Observations 991PUB 1.738 11.654PVT 1.460 9.381NEWPVT -0.803 -3.431Notes: FD = Fixed Deposits, SD = Saving Deposits, CD = Current Deposits,INV = Investments, ADV = Loans and Advances, B = Number of branches,W = Wage-rental ratio, T = Time trend (Year), * denotes signicance (Kodde and Palm, 1986)
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Table 3: Mean Cost Eciency of Bank Groups
(Figures in percentage)
Mean Cost Eciency Without Group Dummies Mean Cost Eciency With Group Dummies
Year Public Private Foreign New Private Public Private Foreign New Private
1986 87.40 96.58 34.52 . 85.35 82.95 18.63 .
1987 88.85 96.57 34.71 . 87.67 82.76 18.70 .
1988 88.98 96.28 32.27 . 88.45 81.76 17.20 .
1989 92.83 96.38 41.41 . 93.09 83.24 21.36 .
1990 94.16 96.57 44.37 . 94.64 81.83 25.00 .
1991 94.16 96.47 45.67 . 94.66 80.58 24.98 .
1992 92.17 96.51 47.80 . 92.38 80.06 25.77 .
1993 91.45 95.39 38.31 . 90.97 81.51 20.64 .
1994 88.51 94.08 49.86 . 86.65 79.86 34.20 .
1995 89.86 93.36 51.43 . 88.72 80.52 35.68 .
1996 90.47 92.17 47.77 42.09 89.52 76.53 31.64 9.04
1997 90.88 88.98 47.25 55.71 90.18 74.00 31.38 10.40
1998 91.94 88.27 45.98 64.90 91.46 74.51 30.61 10.11
1999 92.29 88.79 45.24 71.35 91.89 74.04 29.67 10.35
2000 93.97 88.30 48.21 80.28 93.89 78.76 30.81 10.14
Note: . for new private banks prior to their entry.
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Table 4: Indices of Total Factor Productivity and its Components Without Group Dummies
(Figures in percentage)
Technical Change Component Scale Eects Component Eciency Component Total Factor Productivity
Year Public Private Foreign Public Private Foreign Public Private Foreign Public Private Foreign
1986 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1987 99.75 100.90 97.54 100.00 99.92 99.79 101.63 99.99 104.68 101.38 100.81 102.01
1988 99.78 102.24 95.89 100.09 100.14 99.95 101.67 99.77 96.00 101.54 102.15 91.98
1989 100.23 104.11 94.68 99.96 100.00 99.72 106.14 99.88 116.69 106.34 103.99 110.44
1990 101.10 106.20 94.04 99.90 99.87 100.64 107.75 100.07 125.38 108.81 106.13 118.95
1991 102.30 108.68 93.91 99.92 99.79 100.39 107.75 99.96 129.64 110.11 108.41 122.51
1992 104.05 111.37 92.59 99.98 99.72 100.05 105.36 100.01 142.85 109.62 111.07 132.86
1993 106.20 114.94 91.84 100.05 99.49 99.18 104.55 98.82 106.64 111.13 113.06 96.95
1994 108.41 118.80 92.52 100.02 99.25 100.01 101.01 97.28 124.41 109.63 114.81 114.65
1995 110.81 122.95 93.82 99.90 98.82 101.08 102.62 96.56 120.26 113.68 117.48 113.65
1996 113.80 128.01 96.08 99.77 98.60 100.10 103.34 95.42 110.98 117.39 120.67 106.53
1997 117.09 133.86 98.21 99.63 97.73 97.66 103.83 93.98 105.93 121.19 124.09 101.43
1998 120.91 140.69 100.78 99.45 97.40 97.99 105.06 93.60 105.45 126.35 129.50 103.97
1999 125.27 148.05 103.76 99.27 97.06 98.17 105.44 94.28 104.03 131.15 136.76 105.84
2000 130.17 155.84 106.66 99.02 97.68 98.50 107.42 94.33 109.12 138.40 144.90 114.32
Table 5: Indices of Total Factor Productivity and its Components for New Private Banks
Without Group Dummies
(Figures in percentage)
Year Technical Change Component Scale Eects Component Eciency Component Total Factor Productivity
1995 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1996 104.40 95.76 126.12 126.06
1997 108.76 92.10 149.00 149.39
1998 112.50 90.43 157.16 159.99
1999 116.59 87.95 187.49 192.30
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Table 6: Indices of Total Factor Productivity and its Components With Group Dummies
(Figures in percentage)
Technical Change Component Scale Eects Component Eciency Component Total Factor Productivity
Year Public Private Foreign Public Private Foreign Public Private Foreign Public Private Foreign
1986 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1987 98.94 102.31 96.10 100.39 100.68 108.09 102.72 99.77 104.20 102.05 102.76 108.40
1988 98.35 105.37 93.38 100.74 100.22 110.50 103.48 98.42 94.72 102.56 103.97 97.87
1989 98.23 109.17 90.93 101.22 100.99 123.04 109.07 100.24 112.47 108.46 110.44 124.75
1990 98.69 113.41 89.09 101.56 101.31 115.37 110.97 98.51 130.43 111.22 113.18 134.37
1991 99.65 118.38 87.69 101.66 101.63 122.68 110.98 96.86 131.94 112.41 116.59 142.34
1992 101.38 123.82 84.45 101.61 102.18 124.15 108.19 96.54 144.36 111.49 122.20 152.19
1993 103.60 130.47 81.82 101.69 102.98 131.01 106.49 98.19 104.43 112.27 131.81 113.76
1994 106.09 137.69 81.12 101.92 103.76 114.28 101.08 95.88 130.61 109.52 137.01 126.78
1995 108.78 145.27 81.18 102.04 104.61 113.48 103.57 96.57 129.01 115.13 146.66 124.44
1996 112.09 154.11 82.19 102.01 105.14 112.91 104.55 91.86 113.56 119.68 149.17 110.45
1997 115.91 164.22 83.12 102.00 107.66 120.90 105.37 90.42 107.29 124.69 157.85 113.41
1998 120.38 175.88 84.74 101.94 108.45 117.25 106.87 90.94 108.83 131.19 171.13 113.84
1999 125.60 188.85 87.06 101.86 108.99 116.43 107.35 90.35 107.94 137.37 183.48 115.22
2000 131.50 202.59 89.43 101.70 106.81 116.19 109.78 96.10 112.60 146.72 204.85 123.09
Table 7: Indices of Total Factor Productivity and its Components for New Private Banks
With Group Dummies
(Figures in percentage)
Year Technical Change Component Scale Eects Component Eciency Component Total Factor Productivity
1995 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1996 104.36 117.32 107.92 129.30
1997 108.81 133.67 105.06 149.42
1998 112.58 143.74 102.18 161.75
1999 116.73 156.44 110.40 195.02
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Figure 1: Mean Cost Eciency
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Figure 2: Indices of Total Factor Productivity
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